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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FLYING DIAMOND OIL CORPORATION, 
formerly known as FLYING DIAMOND 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
NEWTON SHEEP COMPANY, a limited 
partnership; RALPH M. NEWTON, 
EUGENE B. NEWTON and SCOTT F. 
NEWTON, general partners; and 
EUGENE B. NEWTON, individually, 
and EDNA ELLIOTT NEWTON, his wife, 
and 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BASS ENTERPRISES PRODUCTION CO., 
a Texas corporation, 
Intervenor Defendant-
Respondent. 
Case No. 19178 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NEWTON SHEEP COMPANY, ET AL. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff-appellant brought the instant action for 
declaratory judgment contending that it was entitled to a 2 1/2 
percent payment provided for in a Surface Owner's Agreement 
entered into between Champlin Petroleum Company and Newton. 
The case sought a resolution as to conflicting claims to the 
percentage payment. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Flying Diamond Oil Company, brought 
suit in the District Court of Summit County, State of Utah, on 
June 30, 1978, seeking various relief against Newton Sheep 
Company, et al., and included in Count I, which is relevant to 
this appeal, an action for declaratory judgment (R. 1-4). The 
instant appeal concerns only the matter raised in Count I of 
the appellant's complaint and the counterclaim thereto. An 
answer and counterclaim were duly filed by Newton Sheep 
Company, et al. (R. 17) and a reply duly filed by appellant 
(R. 28). Subsequently, Bass Enterprises Production Company 
sought and was granted intervention (R. 89, 90). Thereafter, 
Bass filed an answer and counterclaim to the complaint of 
Flying Diamond and a cross-claim against Newton Sheep. Bass 
contended for an interest in the payment involved in the 
litigation by virtue of a deed from Newton to Bass (R. 94). 
Replies were duly filed by Flying Diamond and Newton to the 
Bass pleadings (R. 109, 174). An amended answer, counterclaim, 
and cross-claim were filed by Bass and duly replied to by 
Flying Diamond and Newton. A pretrial order was entered by the 
trial court setting forth the narrow issue to be tried in the 
case (R. 276). It was agreed that the only issues to be tried 
were Flying Diamond!s claims for declaratory judgment and the 
counterclaims thereon. Trial was held in the District Court of 
-2-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Summit County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, 
Jr., District Judge, presiding, on January 19, 1982. Following 
the trial, an interlocutory judgment was entered on May 20, 
1982, signed May 19, 1982 (R. 431, 433). Findings of fact and 
conclusions of law were also entered at the same time (R. 426, 
430). A motion denying a motion to amend the proposed findings 
of fact and judgment was entered on June 7, 1982. A final 
judgment was signed April 8, 1983, and entered April 13, 1983 
(R. 450). The trial court's judgment was in favor of Newton 
and Bass and against Flying Diamond. A notice of appeal was 
duly filed by the appellant on May 2, 1983. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, Newton Sheep Company, seeks to have the 
judgment of the trial court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The instant appeal involves litigation over certain 
interests arising out of real estate transactions in Summit 
County, Utah. The defendant, Newton Sheep Company, is the 
successor in interest to properties originally owned by Hyrum 
J. Newton Company, a corporation (To 7). The company became a 
limited partnership and the defendants include the partnership 
and the individual partners. On September 24, 1971, Champlin 
Oil Company, a subsidiary of Union Pacific Railroad, entered 
~3-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
into a Surface Owner's Agreement with Newton (R. 2). The 
mineral interest claimed by Champlin, and not in dispute in 
this matter, is from a railroad grant to Union Pacific 
Railroad. This is not a case where the mineral interest was 
alienated to an oil company developer subject to reservation. 
It is the interest conveyed by the Surface Owner's Agreement 
that is involved in this litigation (Exhibit 1, R. 476). 
Section 2 of the Surface Agreement provided: 
Champlin agrees, so long as it is receiving 
oil and/or gas production from or oil and/or gas 
royalties upon production from the described 
premises or allocated thereto under the 
provisions of a unitization agreement, to pay or 
cause to be paid to the Land Owner in cash the 
value on the premises of two and one-half percent 
(2 1/2%) of all the oil and gas and associated 
liquid hydrocarbons hereafter produced, saved, 
and marketed therefrom or allocated thereto as 
aforesaid, except oil and gas and associated 
liquid hydrocarbons used in operations on the 
premises or used under the unitization agreement, 
and except that as to cashinghead gasoline and 
other products manufactured from gas there shall 
be deducted the cost of manufacture; . . . ." 
!• The trial transcript in the instant case refers to the 
Surface Owner's Agreement as a service owner's 
agreement. This appears to be a mistake of the court 
reporter. 
Newton Sheep Company will be referred to as "Newton" 
and Bass Enterprises Production Company as "Bass". 
Appellant will be referred to as Flying Diamond even 
though it has changed its name. 
The documents in the Record will be cited as (R. ). 
The trial transcript will be referenced as (T. JT 
4-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Section 4 of the agreement expressly disclaimed that the 
agreement constituted any covenant to drill by Champlin. 
Section 5 made Champlin liable for damage to the land owners 
(surface owner), lands, buildings, and growing crops caused by 
the erection or construction of facilities in conjunction with 
oil and gas operations (R. 476). Section 7 of the Surface 
Agreement provided: 
Subject to the provisions of Section 9 
hereof, it is agreed that the covenants to pay 
the sums provided in Sections 2, 3, and 5 hereof 
shall be covenants running with the surface 
ownership of the described premises and shall not 
be held or transferred separately therefrom, and 
any sums payable under this agreement shall be 
paid to the person or persons owning the surface 
of the described premises as of the date the oil 
or gas or associated liquid hydrocarbon 
production is marketed. Champlin shall not, 
however, become obligated to make such payments 
to any subsequent purchaser of the described 
premises and shall continue to make such payments 
to the Land Owner until the first day of the 
month following the receipt by Champlin of notice 
of change of ownership, consisting of the 
original or certified copies of the instrument or 
instruments constituting a complete chain of 
title from the Land Owner to the party claiming 
such ownership, and then only as to payments 
thereafter made. 
Subsequent to the Surface Ownerfs Agreement being 
entered into, Newton conveyed by deed part of the royalty 
interest or payment entitlement due Newton under the Surface 
Agreement (Exhibit 1) to the intervener, Bass Enterprises 
(T. 12, R. 484). The deed transferring the interest was dated 
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February 1, 197 2. The deed encompassed fee lands as well as 
railroad lands, but only the railroad lands are involved in 
this case. At the time Newton owned the surface of the lands 
in question and Union Pacific Railroad, e.g., Champlin, owned 
the mineral interests. Newton also owned fee lands and mineral 
interests that were not owned by the railroad. At the time of 
the execution of the deed to Bass Enterprises, the Surface 
Owner's Agreement was of record and Bass and Newton were aware 
fo the Surface Owner's Agreement (T. 11). Scott Newton, a 
general partner and secretary of Newton (T. 58), acknowledged 
that the purpose of the deed to Bass was to convey one-half of 
the 2 1/2 percent payment interest that Newton had by virtue of 
the Surface Agreement with Champlin (T. 60, 65). The deed from 
Newton to Bass expressly mentioned the Union Pacific Railroad 
Company lands (R. 485) and purported to grant, bargain, sell, 
convey, transfer, assign, and deliver to Bass none-half of the 
royalty (of any type) from production of minerals that the 
grantor actually received or is entitled to receive until 
February 1, 2072 from identified Union Pacific lands." 
(R. 484, Exhibit 2). The deed, therefore, purported to assign 
one-half of the 2 1/2 percent interest that Newton had from the 
Surface Owner's Agreement to Bass. Thereafter, on April 12, 
1974, Newton , as seller, entered into a real estate contract 
with appellant, Flying Diamond Corporation (R. 489). The 
-6-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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surface rights that Newton owned in the railroad and other 
lands were conveyed to Flying Diamond. Paragraph 6 of that 
agreement provided that the property being transferred "shall 
include the full surface and one-half of the oil, gas and other 
mineral rights and estates of!f Newton. «Ihe mineral interest 
was defined as including none-half of the royalty (of any type) 
from the production of minerals that the seller actually 
receives or is entitled to receive from the property so 
designated in Attachment A-l until January 1, 2073." Thus, 
Newton's conveyance to Flying Diamond was expressly limited to 
one-half of the royalty interest remaining that had not been 
conveyed to Bass that Newton was entitled to by virtue of the 
Surface Owner's Agreement (R. 493). Scott Newton expressly 
advised Flying Diamond that Newton had sold 50 percent of the 
2 1/2 percent royalty interest to Bass and that Newton wanted 
to keep at least one-half of the remaining interest they 
owned. This would mean that Newton would keep one quarter of 
the 2 1/2 percent and Flying Diamond would receive one quarter 
of the 2 1/2 percent (T. 64, 65). The language on page 4 of 
the Ranch Purchase Contract between Newton and Flying Diamond 
(Exhibit 3) pertaining to the royalty interest is the same 
language as appears on page 2 of the Bass/Newton contract 
(T. 50), thus showing that both agreements contemplated the 
same royalty or payment interest. 
.7. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
At the time of trial, Judge Baldwin indicated that 
although he would receive testimony about the transactions 
between the parties he would not consider the evidence for the 
purposes of varying the terms of the agreements but would have 
to study the agreements to properly interpret them (T. 54). 
Following the presentation of some testimony and further 
argument of counsel, the Court again refused to allow any 
testimony to come in in violation of the parol evidence rule 
(T. 82-84). The Court also indicated that although it would 
receive the depositions of Russell E. Neihart, William B. 
Callister and Robert B. Logerstrom that the Court would not 
receive the depositions for altering the written documents 
(T. 83-92). Judge Baldwin expressly said that he would not 
allow parol evidence to interpret the contract between the 
parties (T. 92). Further, after the court!s ruling, counsel 
for the appellant expressly requested the Court to read all of 
the depositions and offered a greater amount of the deposition 
evidence than had been offered by Newton or Bass (T. 83-92). 
Based upon the evidence heard and the contracts, the 
trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
They were entered on May 19, 1982 (R. 426-430). The Court 
found that Newton entered into the Surface Agreement with 
Champlin in September of 1971, which agreement was recorded 
October 1, 1971 (R. 427). That in February, 1972, Newton 
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conveyed to Bass by warranty deed recorded on March 20, 1972, 
one-half of the royalty payment from the production of minerals 
that Newton was entitled to receive. The Court found that Bass 
was charged with knowledge of the terms of the Surface Owner's 
Agreement (R. 428). The Court found that in April, 1974, 
Flying Diamond, with knowledge of the Surface Owner's 
Agreement, and the Bass/Newton deed entered into the ranch 
purchase contract (Exhibit 3) in which they acquired one-half 
of Newton's oil, gas and mineral rights through the language 
previously referred to herein (R. 428). The Court found that 
Newton's transfer to Flying Diamond was with the intent that 
Flying Diamond acquire one-fourth of the 2 1/2 percent payment 
referred to in the Surface Agreement (R. 428). The Court's 
conclusions of law were to the effect that the Surface Owner's 
Agreement did not prohibit an assignment of an interest in 
monies paid by Champ1in under the agreement and that there was 
no express prohibition in the Surface Agreement (Exhibit 1) 
against an assignment by Newton of an interest in the 2 1/2 
percent payment. The deed from Newton to Bass was held 
effective to assign to Bass one-half of the 2 1/2 percent 
payment. The ranch purchase contract was held to have retained 
for Newton one-fourth of the 2 1/2 percent payment. The Court 
concluded that appellant, Flying Diamond, was entitled to 
retain one-fourth of the 2 1/2 percent payment. The Court 
-9-
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further found that Flying Diamond was estopped to deny that it 
only had a one-fourth interest in the 2 1/2 percent payment and 
that Newton and Bass were not estopped to assert the interests 
the Court found the parties were entitled to in the 2 1/2 
percent payment (R. 429). The interlocutory judgment was 
entered thereon and the final judgment entered on April 13, 
1983 (R. 460), implemented the Court's findings and conclusions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE 2 1/2 PERCENT PAYMENT UNDER THE SURFACE 
AGREEMENT WAS NOT A COVENANT RUNNING WITH THE 
LAND TO WHICH FLYING DIAMOND OR THE SURFACE OWNER 
WAS PERPETUALLY ENTITLED. 
Flying Diamond contends that it is entitled to the 
2 1/2 percent interest referred to in the Surface Agreement 
between Newton and Champlin Oil Company by virtue of the fact 
that Flying Diamond subsequently acquired the surface 
interest. Paragraph 2 of Exhibit 1 provides that Champlin 
agrees so long as it is receiving oil and/or gas production 
from or oil and/or gas royalties upon production from the 
described premises or allocated thereto under the provisions of 
a unitization agreement, to pay or caused to be paid to the 
landowner in cash the value on the premises of two and one-half 
percent (2 1/2%) of all oil and gas and associated liquid 
hydrocarbons hereinafter produced. The right for anyone to 
-10-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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receive payment under the Surface Agreement is conditioned upon 
production of oil and gas and a royalty allocation from the 
production. The agreement also provides for the payment of the 
2 1/2 percent from the commingling when the production of oil 
from lands under the several surface ownerships is placed in 
one central bank. Section 5 of the Surface Agreement provides 
that Champlin is required to pay for all damage to the 
landowner's lands, buildings and growing crops caused by the 
erection or construction of facilities to be used in connection 
with oil or gas or associated liquid hydrocarbon operation and 
to take various other actions to protect the surface of the 
lands. This obligation of Champlin is unrelated to the 2 1/2 
percent payment. Therefore, the 2 1/2 percent payment is not 
to compensate the surface owner for injury to the property 
since Section 5 is an indemnification provision to cover the 
mineral developer's obligation to pay the surface owner or any 
damage to the land and to take actions to protect the surface 
owner's interest. Section 7 provides that "the covenants to 
pay the sums provided in Sections 2, 3 and 5 shall be covenants 
running with the surface ownership of the described premises 
and shall not be held or transferred separately therefrom, and 
any sums payable under this agreement shall be paid to the 
person or persons owning the surface of the described premises 
as of the date of the oil and gas or associated liquid 
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hydrocarbon production is marketed/1 (R. 480) Section 7 
further provides that Champlin shall not become obligated to 
make payments to any subsequent purchaser of the premises until 
such time that Champlin is "given notice of a change of 
ownership11. From these provisions Flying Diamond contends that 
Newton could not have transferred any interest in the 2 1/2 
percent payment right to Bass or any other persons separate 
from the surface interest because the provisions of Sections 2 
and 7 constitute covenants running with the land. Newton 
respectfully submits that Flying Diamond misconstrues the 
concept of covenants running with the land and that the 
payments provision in paragraph 2 of the Surface Agreement does 
not constitute a covenant running with the land nor does 
Section 7 make it so, but rather the provision of Section 2 
grants to the landowner the right to receive a payment based on 
production equal to 2 1/2 percent of the value of the 
production. The Surface Agreement does not grant Newton a 
specific right in any mineral but only a right to receive 
payment. Nor does Section 2 obligate Newton to do anything 
with the payment. It need not be used on the land to improve 
it, but may be used in any way the landowner wants. The grant 
under Section 2 is therefore not something about the land or a 
reserved interest that Newton once had in the mineral estate. 
The interest here should be compared with a right to a specific 
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mineral interest which could improve a covenant running with 
the land because it would directly effect the land. See, 
Restatement of Property, §§ 543 and 544. Here, Newton's right 
to any part of the 2 1/2 percent payment is not based on any 
previous interest in the land that Newton had. Rather, it is a 
contractual right to receive a personal payment. This is not 
such an interest as will run with the land. Newton or the 
surface owners had no obligation to the land that involved or 
involves the 2 1/2 percent payment. The criteria for 
determining whether a covenant runs with the land are spelled 
out in 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Covenants, Conditions, Etc. § 30: 
The primary test whether the covenant runs 
with the land or is merely personal is whether it 
concerns the thing granted and the occupation or 
enjoyment thereof, or is a collateral or a 
personal covenant not immediately concerning the 
thing granted. In order that a covenant may run 
with the land it must have relation to the land 
or the interest or estate conveyed, and the thing 
required to be done must be somethig which 
touches such land, interest, or estate and the 
occupation, use, or enjoyment thereof. Whether a 
particular covenant is sufficiently connected 
with the use of land to run with the land must be 
in many cases a question of degree. There must 
also be privity of estate between the parties to 
the covenant, and the covenant must be consistent 
with the estate to which it adheres and of such 
character that the estate will not be defeated or 
changed by the performance thereof. A covenant 
in a deed is not made one running with the land 
merely by the fact that it is a part of the 
consideration expressed in the deed. 
\ 
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* * * * 
In the event that the act to be performed is 
merely collateral to the -land and does not relate 
to the property demised, then the assignee is not 
charged, though named in the covenant. The 
covenant is merely personal, and does not affect 
the land demised. The fundamental principle that 
only those covenants which touch and concern the 
land, even though the assignee is named in the 
covenant, can run with the land and charge the 
assignee, is enunciated in Spencer's Case, a 
leading English case on the law of covenants. 
In appellantfs brief appellant places great emphasis 
on the language of Section 7 of the Surface Agreement. 
However, the mere fact that Section 7 of the Surface Agreement 
characterizes the 2 1/2 percent payment as a covenant running 
with the land does not make it such. In 20 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Covenants, Conditions, Etc., § 30, it is noted: 
If a covenant is not in its nature and kind 
a real covenant, the declaration of the parties 
in the instrument that it shall run with the land 
cannot create a real covenant. If no interest 
passes and no possession attends the conveyance, 
the convenant obviously does not run with the 
land. 
In H.T.C. v. Whitehouse, 47 Utah 323, 154 P.2d 950 (1916), this 
Court observed that a covenant of warranty by one neither 
having possession nor title does not run with the land. The 
2 1/2 percent payment, therefore, must be measured against the 
legal criteria for covenants running with the land to determine 
whether it is a covenant real or a personal covenant. If the 
criteria are not met for a covenant running with the land 
Section 7 of the Surface Agreement cannot make it such. 
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It is submitted that when the substance of the Surface 
Agreement is actually analyzed against the relevant legal 
criteria that the only conclusion that can be legitimately 
drawn is that the 2 1/2 percent payment is not a covenant 
running with the land. First, it is submitted that the 2 1/2 
percent payment does not directly relate to the land or touch 
and concern the land. Second, it is submitted that the 
relationship between Flying Diamond, Champlin and Newton is 
such that there is no privity of estate but at best privity at 
contract, and third, it is submitted that the intention 
standard is at best ambiguous. 
In The City of Tucson v. Superior Court of Pima 
County, 116 Ariz. 322, 569 P.2d 264 (App. 1977), suit was 
brought relating to a conveyance of a ten-foot strip of land to 
the defendant county. One of the counts alleged that the 
property was conveyed to Pima County in consideration for a 
promise that Pima County would not assess the retained portion 
of plaintiff's property for the proposed widening and 
improvement of a road. Plaintiff's understandings constituted 
covenants running with the land. 
The only theory on which the city could be liable 
is if the county's promise were a covenant 
running with the land. To create such a covenant 
at law, four prerequisites must be met: (1) 
there must be a writing which satisfies the 
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statute of frauds; (2) the parties must intend 
that the covenant run with the land; (3) the 
covenant must touch and concern the land; and (4) 
privity of estate must exist between the original 
grantor and the grantee at the time the covenant 
is made. 
The court found the interest involved was not a covenant 
running with the land. The court concluded: 
Since the complaint alleged conveyance of the 
ten-foot strip to the county and its subsequent 
acquisition by the city by annexation, and failed 
to allege facts burdening the property with an 
equitable servitude in favor of the plaintiffs, 
no claim for breach of covenant lay against the 
city. 
The court's assessment of the case was that there was not any 
imposition against the land and, therefore, since the property 
was not burdened there could be no covenant running with the 
land, since the touch and concern criteria was not met. A case 
relevant to the issue before the court is Choisser v. Eyman, 22 
Ariz.App. 587, 529 P.2d 741 (1974). The case involved an 
action to determine the ownership of refund rights under a 
water extension agreement to service property. A contention 
was made that the refund payments were covenants running with 
the land. The court observed: 
To create a covenant at law, four 
prerequisites must be met: (1) there must be a 
writing which satisfies the Statute of Frauds; 
(2) th parties must intend that the covenant run 
with the land; (3) the covenant must touch and 
concern the land, i.e. make the land itself more 
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useful or valuable to the benefited party; and 
(4) privity of estate must exist between the 
original grantor and the grantee at the time the 
covenant is made* C. Smith and R. Boyer, Survey 
of the Law of Property, 356 (2d Ed- 1971). In 
determining whether the entire agreement, 
including the rights to refunds, runs with the 
land, it is important to differentiate between 
the agreement to supply water and the 
consideration given to effectuate that supply. 
The court then went on to say that an agreement to supply water 
to property can be a covenant running with the land citing the 
Restatement of Property, § 548, but then went on to say: 
However, the right to receive the refunds, the 
subject of this appeal, does not touch and 
concern the land. By Clause 7 itself, the right 
to receive the refunds, is a personal right 
enforceable by appellant alone. Restatement of 
Property § 544 (1944). Being a personal right, 
it cannot, by definition, be a covenant running 
with the land. 
The case is analagous to the instant case since the right under 
Section 2 of the Surface Agreement is a right to receive 
payment which is not a matter that touches and concerns the 
land especially when the payment is not obligated for the 
benefit of the land. The requirement that a covenant running 
with the land actually relate to the land is a part of the 
element of touch and concern. Updegrave v. Agee, 258 Ore. 599, 
484 P.2d 821 (1971). In Johnson v. State By and Through The 
Highway Division, 27 Ore.App. 581, 556 P.2d 724 (1976), a 
declaratory judgment was sought contending that a covenant 
given by the predecessors in interest to the plaintiffs ran 
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with the land and was binding upon the plaintiffs. The 
covenant provided that the state would not be required to pay 
for removal or destruction of a house on the property in the 
event the state required additional right of way for a 
highway. The court held that the covenant did not run with the 
land because the benefit to the state contained in the covenant 
was in no way tied to the land owned. One of the elements that 
the court referred to for a covenant running with the land was 
that the promisee must benefit in the use of some land 
possessed by him as the result of the performance of the 
promise. The court held that was lacking in the covenant. 
Essentially, there was an insufficient connection to the land 
to justify finding a covenant running with the land. In 
California Packing Corporation v. Grove, 57 Cal.App. 253, 196 
P. 891 (1921), the court held that a covenant running with the 
land requires a direct grant of the property and is the direct 
benefit of the property. Neither factor is present in the 
instant case, since the grant by Champlin to Newton was of a 
right to receive money and there is no direct benefit to the 
property in question. In CoIonia Verdi Homeowners Assfn v. 
Kaufman, 122 Ariz. 574, 596 P.2d 712 (App. 1979), the court 
observed that a covenant running with the land is something 
that involves fla general plan of development and improvement of 
the property.11 Such an interest would be one of quiet 
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enjoyment. Van Cott v. Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 226 Pac. 460 
(1924) . If the agreement is merely collateral to the land and 
not an integral part of the property, no covenant running with 
the land can be found. 
A decision from this Court, Lundeberg v. Dastrup, 28 
Utah 2d 28 (1972), is directly relevant to this issue. There 
the question arose as to whether a provision for the payment of 
attorneys1 fees necessary for enforcement of the terms of an 
agreement was a covenant running with the land. This Court 
held that such a provision could not be a covenant running with 
the land. 
In regard to the plaintiffs1 further 
argument that the contract provision for 
attorney's fees, assumed by successive assignees, 
and/or combined with the judgment, constitutes a 
covenant running with the land and is therefore 
binding on Alyce Husgands and Nick Caravelli 
against whom the execution was directed, this is 
to be said: In order for a covenant to run with 
the land it must be of such character that its 
performance or nonperformance will so affect the 
use, value, or enjoyment of the land itself that 
it must be regarded as an integral part of the 
property. Examples are the covenants of seizin, 
the right to convey, freedom from encumbrances, 
and of quiet and peaceable possession. 
Contrasted to these are covenants to perform 
personal obligations under the contract, which 
ordinarily do not so run. Under the concept just 
stated a provision in a purchase contract to pay 
attorney's fees necessary for enforcement of its 
terms does not meet the qualification for a 
covenant which runs with the land. 
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In Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 99 Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619 
(1940), the court also stated that attorneys1 fees in an 
agreement were matters of personal payment and did not 
constitute covenants running with the land. The case law, 
therefore, seems to support the proposition that generally the • 
right to receive a payment is not necessarily a covenant 
running with the land especially where it is not dependent upon 
any obligation towards the land itself. In the instant case, 
Champlin was otherwise obligated independent of the 2 1/2 
percent payment to protect the surface estate. Champlin 
already had a right to the use of the surface estate in pursuit 
of its mineral interests. Flying Diamond Corporation v. Rust, 
551 P.2d 509 (Utah 1976). Newton was not obligated to employ 
the 2 1/2 percent in any way to the betterment of the land. 
Thus, the touch and concern element of a covenant running with 
the land is not present. Contrast this court's position in 
Ruffinego v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 (Utah 1978), where the court 
held a covenant running with the land existed where the 
covenant was one that directly benefited and protected the 
land. Therefore, the touch and concern element required for a 
covenant running with the land is not present in the instant 
case. 
It is further submitted that the privity of estate 
requirement for a covenant running with the land is not present 
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in the instant situation. No interest in the land was conveyed 
by Champlin to Newton nor by Newton to Champlin and then in 
turn to Flying Diamond. Champlin's interest in mineral estate 
existed separate and apart from Newton's surface ownership 
right. The Surface Agreement was merely a contractual 
concern. The surface of the land and mineral estates were 
separately owned. Although the agreement between Newton and 
Champlin creates a contractual privity, there is no privity in 
the estate as distinct from the privity to receive a payment 
from the oil and gas production. Thus, it is submitted that 
the classic requirement of privity of estate is missing. In 20 
Am. Jur. 2d, Covenants, Conditions, Etc., § 34, it is stated: 
The term 'privity of estate' connotes a mutual or 
successive relationship to the same rights of 
property, and not privity in estate or mutuality 
with the meaning of the feudal law. Therefore, 
unless privity of estate exists, as thus defined, 
the covenant is purely a personal obligation, 
neither binding nor benefiting the land in the 
hands of heirs, devisees, or assigns. 
A distinction is made between privity of 
contract and privity of estate, and the rule is 
that privity of contract alone is insufficient to 
carry the benefit of a covenant to subsequent 
owners of the property. 
Finally, it is submitted that the intention 
requirement for a covenant running with the land is not present 
in this case in the sense of an intent to create a legal 
interest in property, but, rather, merely a covenant or 
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warranty to accommodate Champlin's willingness to pay the 
revenue from 2 1/2 percent of production for its protection. 
It should also be r.oted that Champlin agrees to make payment to 
a transferee only on notice of transfer. Champlin has no 
interest in making the payment to any particular person except 
to satisfy its contractual obligations in accordance with the 
Surface Agreement. Champlin has no concern as to any 
assignment of any interest in the payment as to third person 
except that it not be obligated to any third person. Its 
concern is one of accounting to insure that the payment be made 
to an identified individual. Roger D. Lagerstrom , an employee 
of Champlin Oil Company, gave a deposition which was offered 
into evidence by Flying Diamond that Champlin had no interest 
and wouldn't care what happened so far as an assignment between 
the surface owner and a third person as to the proceeds of the 
Champlin payment. (Lagerstrom Deposition, 35-37). It is 
submitted, therefore, that the type of intention required for a 
covenant running with the land is lacking or at least 
ambiguous. In First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons Sc Reed 
Company, 27 Utah 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971), this court dealt with 
a claim that a covenant running with the land was created by an 
agreement to leave the tract of property contoured for 
residential supervision purposes after removing sand, gravel 
and fill materials thereform. The court found that the 
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requisite requirement of "some permanent effect of a physical 
nature upon the land itself11 was present but that the language 
of the contract was ambiguous as to whether the parties 
intended a covenant for a definite improvement of the land 
which would inure to the benefit of subsequent transferees. In 
the absence of a clear intention the court would not find a 
covenant running with the land. See also, Metropolitan 
Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 376 P.2d 940 (1962). In 
the instant case, what was actually intended so far as 
benefiting the land is not clear and, therefore, the intention 
element of a covenant running with the land is not present. 
It must be concluded that the trial court was correct 
in refusing to find that the Surface Agreement created a 
covenant real running with the land. 
POINT II 
THE 2 1/2 PERCENT PAYMENT IN THE SURFACE 
AGREEMENT WAS SUBJECT TO ASSIGNMENT TO THIRD 
r
 PERSONS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO CHAMPLINfS LIABILITY. 
If the 2 1/2 percent payment is not a covenant running 
with the land the question arises as to whether it may be 
conveyed in whole or part by the surface owner at a time that 
the surface owner has the contractual interest to the 2 1/2 
percent payment. In this case, Newton, as the surface owner, 
having a right to the 2 1/2 percent payment transferred a 
one-half interest in the 2 1/2 payment to Bass pursuant to a 
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deed. The appellants contend that the 2 1/2 percent payment, 
under the Surface Agreement, is not a "royalty11 and, therefore, 
could not be conveyed by Newton to Bass under the deed between 
the parties. A deed that meets the Statute of Frauds and 
otherwise comports with law can transfer whatever interest it 
purports to convey and if ambiguous the subject of the 
conveyance can be established by extrinsic evidence. Flying 
Diamond not being a party or privity to the deed could not 
object to parol evidence as to the intent of the parties. 
Green v. Grant, 635 P.2d 236 (Colo.App. 1981). The record in 
the instant case is clear that both Newton and Bass intended 
that a one-half interest in the 2 1/2 percent payment be 
transferred from Newton to Bass. The only question is whether 
that was a transferable interest. The argument that it was not 
a "royalty11 and, therefore, could not be transferred under the 
deed is an argument in semantics not in legal substance. It 
may be that the 2 1/2 percent payment is not a royalty in the 
traditional sense of something reserved by the land owner who 
otherwise alienated the surface interest from a mineral 
interest. It is, however, recognized that a severed mineral 
and a right to receive payment is a fully transferable interest 
and one well recognized under oil and gas law. in 8 Williams & 
Meyers Oil and Gas Law (Manual of Terms), p. 661, the 
definition of royalty interest is stated: 
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The property interest created in oil and gas 
after a SEVERANCY (q.v.) by ROYALTY DEED (q.v.). 
Its duration is like that of common law estates, 
namely, in fee simple, in fee simply 
determinable, for life or for a fixed term of 
years. It is distinguished from a MINERAL 
INTEREST (q.v.) by the absence of operating 
rights. The owner of a royalty interest is 
entitled to a share of production. 
The definition clearly fits the 2 1/2 percent payment in the 
instant case. On page 660 of the same work, a royalty deed is 
defined as: 
An instrument in writing conveying a ROYALTY 
INTEREST (q.v.). The instrument must name the 
grantor and the grantee, describe the land, give 
the size of the interest, and contain the 
signature of the grantor. 
Thus, the instrument between Newton and Bass was a royalty deed 
conveying a royalty interest, to-wit: one-half of the 2 1/2 
percent right to payment from the production of oil and gas. 
In 1 Williams Se Meyers Oil and Gas Law, § 301, the authors 
discuss the various definitional terms applicable to oil and 
gas matters. With reference to a royalty interest, it is said 
that it is ,fa right only to receive a certain part of the oil 
produced * * * free of exploration and production costs.11 
p. 440. On page 445, the term lfroyalty interest11 is explained: 
Owner has right to receive a certain part of the 
oil or gas, as, if and when produced, free of 
costs of production; has no rights to develop or 
lease. 
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Further, in 8 Williams Sc Meyers Oil and Gas Manual of Terms » 
p. 473, the definition of non-participating royalty is equally 
applicable to the 2 1/2 percent interest in this case. 
Recently, this court in Bennion v. Utah State Board of Oil, Gas 
and Mining, P.2d
 m (Utah, Nov. 4, 1983), considered the 
interest of the plaintiff as a non-consenting mineral owner 
under the pooling provisions of the Oil and Gas Conservation 
Act. In discussing the interests at one point the court notes 
that Shell Oil Company characterized its payment concession as 
a 'Voluntary payment11 and at another point the term royalty 
inerest is utilized and payment from production. The 
implication from the case is that the terminology is not 
settled and what is important is the substance that is 
conveyed. See also, Martin v. Glass, 571 F.Supp. 1406 (D.C. 
N.D. Tex. 1983). The deed contained all the necessary legal 
prerequisites to transfer one-half of the 2 1/2 percent 
interest and, therefore, accomplished the intention of the 
parties. Nor can Flying Diamond, as a stranger to the 
contract, attack its terms and effect if the interest conveyed 
was otherwise alienable. § 70A-2-107(l), Utah Code Ann. 1953, 
is relevant to this issue. 
(1) A contract for the sale of minerals or the 
like (including oil or gas) or a structure or its 
materials to be removed from realty is a contract 
for the sale of goods within this chapter if they 
are to be severed by the seller but until 
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severance a purported present sale thereof which 
is not effective as a transfer of an interest in 
land is effective only as a contract to sell. 
This definition highlights the distinction between mineral 
interests and royalty interest and further emphasizes the fact 
that a production payment of royalty interest after severance 
is personalty and fully transferable. In Hartman v. Potter, 
596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979), this Court observed: "Minerals 
in place may be severed from the land, and when so severed they 
become separate and distinct estates, held in separate and 
distinct titles.11 Therefore, there was no prohibition in the 
transfer of one-half of the 2 1/2 percent Newton made to Bass 
simply because of the definition of terms or the 
characterization of the interest was a "royalty11. 
The real question is whether the provisions of Section 
7 of the Surface Agreement would act to, in any way, prevent 
Newton from transferring to Bass Newton's right to receive 
payment. The Restatement of Contracts, 2d, § 322, deals with a 
contractual prohibition against assignment. It states: 
(1) Unless the circumstances indicate the 
contrary, a contract term prohibiting assignment 
of 'the contract1 bars only the delegation to an 
assignee of the performance by the assignor of a 
duty or condition. 
(2) A contract term prohibiting assignment of 
rights under the contract, unless a different 
intention is manifested, . . . 
(b) gives the obligor a right to damages for 
breach of the terms forbidding assignment but 
does not render the assignment ineffective; 
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(c) is for the benefit of the obligor, and 
does not prevent the assignee from acquiring 
rights against the assignor or the obligor from 
discharging his duty as if there were no such 
prohibition. 
Further, Section 321 of the same work recognizes that an 
assignment of future rights is effective in the same way as an 
assignment of an existing writing. Applying these sections to 
the facts of the instant case it is apparent that the transfer 
from Newton to Bass was a proper and legal transfer. The 
transfer to Bass in no way increased the burden of obligation 
on Champlin. It did not by delegation impose on Bass any duty 
or condition that was due to Champlin by Newton. There was 
nothing personal that either Newton or Bass had to perform with 
reference to Champlin. The assignment was simply an assignment 
of a right to future payment and under such circumstances could 
be validly assigned to the assignee without impairing the 
position of the obligor. The legality of the assignment is not 
affected and the only person who can complain would be Champlin 
who would have a right for damages if any were incurred. Since 
it has not been affected by the assignment it has incurred no 
damages and the transfer of one-half in the 2 1/2 percent 
payment from Newton to Bass cannot be challenged. The trial 
court, therefore, acted properly in finding a legitimate 
assignment of a one-half interest in the 2 1/2 percent from 
Newton to Bass. 
-28-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Finally, it should be noted that the trial court's 
construction and interpretation of the Newton/Bass transfer and 
the Newton/Flying Diamond contract was in keeping with the only 
practical construction of the various instruments. In the 
Newton/Bass transfer Newton, which possessed the 2 1/2 percent 
interest gave up one-half of that amount. This left a one-half 
interest in the 2 1/2 percent interest remaining in Newton. 
The effect of the transfer under the Newton/Flying Diamond 
Ranch Contract was to transfer one-half of the remaining 
one-half leaving Newton with a one-quarter interest in the 
2 1/2 percent and Flying Diamond receiving the same. In 
Hartman v. Potter, supra, this Court gave a similar 
construction to various deeds transferring interests in oil, 
gas and minerals. 
POINT III 
APPELLANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM CONTENDING THAT THEY 
ARE ENTITLED TO THE FULL 2 1/2 PERCENT PAYMENT. 
When Newton entered into the Ranch Purchase Contract with 
Flying Diamond on April 12, 1974 (R. 489), the Surface 
Agreement with Champlin and Newton was on file as was the 
Newton/Bass deed (R. 484). Further, Flying Diamond was 
expressly made aware of both the purpose of the Bass/Newton 
deed and the desire of Newton to retain 1/2 of their remaining 
entitlement to the 2 1/2 percent royalty interest (T. 61-65). 
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Flying Diamond then drafted the Ranch Purchase Contract. The 
contract expressly referenced the intention of Newton in 
paragraph 2 (R. 493) by providing "one half of the royalty (of 
any type) from the production of minerals that the seller 
actually received or is entitled to receive from the 
property • . . until January 1, 2073M was conveyed leaving 
Newton the remaining 1/2 or 1/4 of 2 1/2 percent. That 
language is virtually identical with the language in the 
Bass/Newton deed (R. 485). Thus, the clear purpose of the 
Flying Diamond contract was to accommodate the interests of all 
concerned to the 2 1/2 percent as divided. The trial court so 
found (R. 478) and concluded as a matter of law that Flying 
Diamond nis estopped to deny that it has only a one-fourth 
interest in the 2 1/2 percent payment.11 (R. 429). 
It is submitted that this conclusion is clearly correct for 
three reasons: 
First: Flying Diamond drafted the Ranch Purchase 
Contract. Under such circumstances the instrument is to be 
construed against Flying Diamond as the party drafting the 
instrument. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Midwest Realty & Finance, 
Inc., 544 P.2d 882 (Utah 1975); Vingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 28 
Utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007 (1972); Matter of Orrfs Estate, 622 
P.2d 337 (Utah 1980). Further, such a construction comports 
with the intention of the parties when all documents are 
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construed together. Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 
1979); Chourros v. D'Agnillo, 642 P.2d 710 (Utah 1982). 
Second: Flying Diamond may not by its action both claim 
under the contract and at the same time claim it is not bound 
by its terms. It is recognized that*a grantee (Flying Diamond) 
may be estopped by equitable considerations. 28 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Estoppel & Waiver § 13. It was recognized in Page v. 
Fees-Kreg, Inc., 617 P.2d 1188 (Colo. 1980); Hess v. Seeger, 55 
Or. App. 746, 641 P.2d 23 (1981); that ordinarily a party (or 
contract purchaser) cannot claim under an instrument without 
affirming it. A party may, by his subsequent conduct, be 
estopped to claim estoppel or other prior benefit. Utah State 
Building & Loan Assn. v. Perkins, 53 Utah 474, 173 P. 950 (Utah 
1918). Flying Diamond being fully aware of the circumstances 
cannot now claim the 2 1/2 percent. Flying Diamond drafted the 
contract to accommodate Newton who insisted on retaining their 
1/4 percent. Without the specific terms in the Ranch Contract 
Newton would not close the deal, and most probably would have 
i 
required a more direct novation or release from Flying Diamond 
of any claim to the 2 1/2 percent payment beyond that 
specifically contained in the Ranch Contract. The evidence 
i 
supports the conclusion that Newton relied on Flying Diamond 
for the express recognition of their interest as well* as that 
of Bass. As this court noted in Rodgers v. Hansen, 580 P.2d 
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233 (Utah 1978) generally one is not permitted in a court of 
justice to take advantage of or claim protection by reason of 
his own wrong. See Provo City v. Cropper, 28 Utah 2d 1, 497 
P.2d 629 (1972); McFarland's Estate v. Holt, 18 Utah 2d 127, 
417 P.2d 244 (1966); Feese v. Siegelfs Estate, 534 P.2d 85 
(Utah 1975); Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 
(Utah 1980) . The circumstances fully support the application of 
equitable estoppel against Flying Diamond. 
Third, whatever claims that Flying Diamond may have been 
entitled to assert to the 2 1/2 percent payment provided for in 
the Surface Agreement have now merged into the Ranch Purchase 
Contract to which Flying Diamond agreed. Flying Diamond was 
aware of the Surface Agreement and claims of Newton 8c Bass in 
regard to the 2 1/2 percent interest. Still Flying Diamond 
entered into negotiations with Newton for the Ranch property 
and a limited mineral interest. Therefore, whatever claims 
they had to the 2 1/2 percent, because of any prior instrument, 
they compromised such claim and merged all terms of their 
interest into the Ranch Contract. Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 P.2d 
50 (Utah 1978); Bowen v. Olsen, 576 P.2d 862 (Utah 1978); 
Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977); Neely v. Kelsch, 
600 P«2d 979 (Utah 1979). This estops Flying Diamond from now 
attempting to claim the full 2 1/2 percent payment contained in 
the Surface Agreement (Exhibit 1). 
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The trial court was clearly correct in concluding that 
Flying Diamond was estopped to deny the Newton/Bass interests 
and to claim the full 2 1/2 percent payment. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANTS MAY NOT CLAIM ESTOPPEL BY DEED TO 
CLAIM THE FULL 2 1/2 PERCENT PAYMENT INTEREST. 
The appellants, Flying Diamond, attempt to invoke the 
concept of estoppel by deed in their favor by asserting that 
Newton may not deny the Surface Agreement. The doctrine has no 
application in the context of this case. The Surface Agreement 
(Exhibit 1, R. 476) goes no further than its own terms. It 
applies only to insure the respective signatories obtain that 
for which they bargained. It grants no further rights or 
interests than are contained within its provisions. Newton has 
always maintained the 2 1/2 percent payment was one it held 
personally and had the privilege to alienate. Indeed, Flying 
Diamond was aware of the Surface Agreement, the deed from 
Newton to Bass, and the fact that Newton and Bass believed that 
one-half of the 2 1/2 percent had been transferred by Newton to 
Bass (T. 61-65) • Flying Diamond was also aware of the fact 
that Newton believed they retained a one-half interest in the 
2 1/2 percent payment and that Newton wanted to retain one-half 
of the interest they held when Newton transferred the surface 
and some royalty interest to Flying Diamond. The same language 
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on the royalty interest was used in the Flying Diamond contract 
as was used in the Newton/Bass deed thus showing that Flying 
Diamond recognized the Newton/Bass interest. Newton does not 
deny Champlinfs right to use the surface, nor does it deny 
Champlin may make the royalty interest payment in accord with 
the Surface Agreement. What is at issue is the relationship 
and claims of ownership to the 2 1/2 percent proceeds after 
paid, as between Bass/Newton and Flying Diamond. Thus, the 
facts raise no issue for the doctrine of estoppel by deed. It 
is well established that estoppel by deed is not applicable 
where the parties are aware of all the facts. Ketchum Coal Co. 
v. Pleasant Valley Const. Co., 50 Utah 395, 168 P. 86 (1917); 
Rogers v. Donnellan, 11 Utah 108, 39 P. 474 (1975); Arizona 
Central Credit Union v. Holden, 6 Ariz.App. 310, 432 P.2d 276 
(1967). 28 Am Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 5 notes: 
Moreover, it has been held that if the party 
claiming the benefit of the estoppel has not been 
misled by the other party's deed, or recital 
therein, no estoppel exists. 
Further, the appellant appears to be claiming estoppel against 
Newton and its privy Bass (although Flying Diamond is also in 
privy with Newton on the Ranch Contract but not with Bass). 
The contract between Flying Diamond and Newton conveyed what 
Flying Diamond bargained for. It did not purport to convey 
more than what Flying Diamond actually received. Thus, Newton 
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is not estopped to deny it conveyed more than it did. Flying 
Diamond is trying to use estoppel to exceed the terms of the 
Ranch Contract. This it cannot do. 
As to any claim of estoppel drawn from the Surface 
Agreement, there is no basis for estoppel by deed. Estoppel is 
not applicable where the deed is unclear as to the actual 
conveyance. Colman v. Butkovich, 556 P.2d 503 (Utah 1976). 
The doctrine of estoppel by deed cannot enlarge the conveyance 
itself. nTo constitute an estoppel by deed, a distinct precise 
assertion or admission of a fact is necessary. Hence, estoppel 
by deed or similar instrument can arise only where a party has 
conveyed a precise or definite legal estate or right by a 
solemn assurance which he will not be permitted to vary or to 
deny. Such estoppel should be certain to every intent.11 28 
Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 5. See Dowse v. Kammerman, 
122 Utah 85, 246 P.2d 381 (1952). It is also submitted that 
the Surface Agreement between Newton and Champlin is not a deed 
but a contract and the concept of estoppel by deed is not 
strictly applicable. Under the circumstances of this case, 
estoppel by deed is not applicable. Here the actual 
relationship is as to the interests of each party to the 2 1/2 
percent payment arising after the Surface Agreement. The 
doctrine of estoppel by deed applies to one who is in direct 
legal relationship to the grantor. Flying Diamond's 
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relationship is direct only to Newton not Champlin. The 
contract from Newton to Flying Diamond, drafted by Flying 
Diamond, expressly acknowledged the respondent's interests* 
The concept of estoppel by deed in favor of Flying Diamond is 
not conceptually compatible with the facts of this case. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT USE PAROL EVIDENCE TO ALTER 
THE TERMS OF ANY INTEGRATED AGREEMENT RELEVANT TO THE 
LITIGATION AND APPELLANTS HAVE WAIVED ANY CHALLENGE TO 
THE RECEIPT OF PAROL EVIDENCE BY AFFIRMATIVELY USING 
SUCH EVIDENCE. 
Newton submits that the appellant's contention that 
the trial court erred in admitting extrinsic evidence on the 
intent of the parties is not well taken. First, it should be 
noted that appellant does not identify the objectionable 
evidence or show how the trial court misused the evidence. 
Indeed, there is no evidence that the trial court gave any 
consideration to extrinsic evidence to alter any integrated 
writing. The appellant asserts extrinsic evidence was admitted 
on the Surface Owner's Agreement (App. Brief p. 27). An 
examination of the trial court's findings of fact show that the 
court did not consider any such evidence or reference such 
evidence in the findings of fact. The only reference to intent 
in the findings of fact refers to the intention in the 
Newton/Bass agreement and the Flying Diamond/Newton Ranch 
contract (R. 428 1T6, 9). Therefore, appellants have not raised 
a true issue. 
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Second, Judge Baldwin was sensitive to the parol 
evidence problem. At the time of trial, on January 19, 1982, 
the court ruled (T. 66) that parol evidence on discussions 
incorporated in the Flying Diamond/Newton agreement would not 
be received. The court also stated that it would not allow the 
evidence to vary the terms of the Surface Contract (T. 54. See 
also T. 67; T. 83; T. 92). The court never received any 
evidence in violation of the parol evidence rule with reference 
to the Champlin/Newton Surface Agreement. The court sustained 
objections even to the Newton/Bass Newton/Flying Diamond 
documents. The only reference to "intent11 in the findings does 
not purport to be based on extrinsic evidence, but is the 
i 
conclusion clearly to be drawn from the identical wording of 
the Bass/Newton Deed and the Flying Diamond/Newton Ranch 
contract. Since parol evidence was not relied on by the court 
to alter the writings or to base its findings on the meaning of 
any agreement no issue exists on the point. The parol evidence 
rule only prohibits extrinsic evidence to add to, subtract 
i 
from, vary or contradict the terms of a complete and 
unambiguous contract. Combs v. Lufkin, 123 Ariz. 210, 598 P.2d 
1029 (App. 1979); Neely v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979); 
Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974). It is a rule of 
substantive law* Tahoe Nat. Bank v. Phillips, 4 Cal.3d 11, 92 
Cal.Rptr. 704, 480 P.2d 320 (1971); Loppe v. Breed, 504 P.2d 
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1077 (Wyo. 1973); Gulotta v. Triano, 125 Ariz. 144, 608 P.2d 81 
(App. 1980). In the absence of any finding violating the rule 
by applying such evidence in a substantive fashion to alter or 
contradict a fully integrated unambiguous written agreement no 
error has been committed. 
Third, the appellants have been the only party to 
offer and use extrinsic evidence and have gone beyond any 
proffer by respondents. At the time of trial, counsel for 
appellants insisted that all of the depositions offered into 
evidence be read and even made an offer beyond that of Newton 
or Bass (T. 89, 90, 91, 92). The Lagerstrom deposition and 
Callister deposition are cited and relied upon by the 
appellants in their brief (App. Brief, 8, 9). It is well 
settled that a party cannot complain of the courtfs ruling 
where the party thereafter affirmatively adopts or uses the 
evidence. United States v. Silvers, 374 F.2d 828 (7th Cir. 
1967); United States v. Bramson, 139 F.2d 598, 600 (2nd Cir. 
1943); Jarabo v. United States, 158 F.2d 509, 514 (1st Cir. 
1946); Williams Bros. Grocery v. Blanton, 105 Ga.App. 314, 12 
S.E.2d 479, 481 (1962); 1 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed. 1940 
§ 18(D), pp. 344-346. The actions of appellant went beyond 
self-defense and constitute a waiver of this issue. 
Newton agrees with the holding in Hartman v. Potter, 
596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979), that in the absence of ambiguity the 
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terms of the written deed or integrated contract govern. See 
also, Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981). 
In this case, the real ambiguity that the court could have used 
extrinsic evidence for was the Newton/Bass Deed and the Flying 
Diamond/Newton Contract which appeared ambiguous in light of 
all the circumstances. The same could be said of the 
Champlin/Newton Surface Agreement. See First Western v. 
Gibbons & Reed, supra, where the court took extraneous evidence 
on a claim of a covenant running with the land. Also, 
Metropolitan Inv. Co. v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 376 P.2d 940 
(1962). The circumstances in this case are equally as 
ambiguous. Therefore, extrinsic evidence could be considered, 
if it was, without violating the parol evidence rule. Such 
being the case, the trial court committed no error, and 
certainly not prejudicial error. Rule 4, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971). 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court 
should be affirmed. The court clearly recognized that 
appellant's contention that the Surface Agreement created a 
covenant running with the land could not be sustained. That 
the trial court rejected the contention of a covenant running 
with the land is manifested from the notations the trial court 
made on the plaintiff's trial memorandum (R. 377). The legal 
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elements necessary to creating a covenant to run with the land 
do not exist in this case* The court was further correct in 
finding that there had been a valid legal transfer from Bass to 
Newton of a portion of the 2 1/2 percent right to receive 
payment. Further, the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
of the trial court support the contention that Flying Diamond 
is clearly estopped by its own Ranch Contract, which it 
prepared from claiming more than the one-quarter of the 2 1/2 
percent interest which the trial court awarded Flying Diamond. 
No error was committed in the trial court. The law was 
properly applied and the judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
William J. Cayias 
CAYIAS, LIVINGSTON Sc SMITH 
1558 South 1100 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Attorney for Newton Respondents 
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